This article was originally published in The Option Strategist Newsletter Volume 12, No. 10 on May 22, 2003.
Most people think of covered call writing as at least partial protection against a downside move by their stocks. Of course, buying a put as protection for a stock position affords a lot more protection – in fact, complete protection below the striking price. But call writing is generally more popular because it involves taking in option premium rather than paying it out. Still, there are times when one strategy is clearly superior to the other. This is one of those times. So, in this article, we’ll compare how stock owners should view the two in any environment and then specifically address the current environment.
This article was originally published in The Option Strategist Newsletter Volume 2, No. 24 on December 22, 1993.
We have often stated that one can reduce the risk of stock ownership by buying call options instead. This, of course, is contrary to what many consider to be "conventional wisdom", in which option purchases are viewed as extremely risky things. As with most investments — and a lot of other things in life — it's a matter of application; every strategy can't be painted with a broad brush. We'll go over the way to make call option buying a lower-risk alternative to buying common stock, and then we'll apply it to a currently popular strategy involving the purchase of the highest-yielding Dow-Jones stocks at year-end.
This article was originally published in The Option Strategist Newsletter Volume 21, No. 12 on June 29, 2012.
A"call stupid" is a rather arcane and little-known term, which is used to describe a position in which a trader is long two calls at two different strikes (probably with the same expiration date). It is often offset by a short position in the underlying security.
This article was originally published in The Option Strategist Newsletter Volume 20, No. 21 on November 17, 2011.
We have written about the subject of protecting a portfolio of stocks with derivatives several times over the years, although it’s been a while (Volume 19, Numbers 6 and 12 had articles on the subject). Recently, some subscribers have inquired about how to calculate the amount of protection they need.
This article was originally published in The Option Strategist Newsletter Volume 9, No. 3 on February 10, 2000.
We have often spoken about how to calculate or interpret implied volatility, and how to relate it to historic volatility. Some of these discussions have bordered on the theoretical, while others have been quite practical. However, we haven’t really addressed how implied volatility affects a specific option strategy.
The following table is a summary of the results, by strategy, showing the number of positions recommended in that category; the number of wins and losses, the win percentage rate, the total profit or loss in that category, and the average return at annual rate (the average return, annualized using the average holding period).
The double top in $SPX in 2000 led to a huge bear market. Could it be happening again? To their credit, I have heard a few (very few) market commentators on TV mention the fact that there was a double top in the market in 2000, wondering if it could be happening again now. This is pertinent, of course, because $SPX is laboriously trying to get back to the 2870 highs that were set in January. The average bull (who is just about everyone around) laughs at the idea that $SPX could turn down from here. Admittedly, its chart looks strong, but it did in 2000 also. To evaluate the possibilities, we are going to compare the various technical indicators that we use, comparing their current states to their states 18 years ago.
As it stands today, the “Short Volatility Trade” has been watered down to a great extent. Perhaps in an effort to get ahead of the regulators, most of the Exchange Traded Products (ETPs) that deal with “short volatility” have made adjustments so that their products are no longer as volatile as they had previously been.
By Lawrence G. McMillan
One of things I’ll always remember about the Crash of ‘87 (actually, I’ll always remember everything about the Crash of ‘87 – at least from my vantage point) was that the market was down on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday of the week before, with Friday being the worst day. That Friday, October 16th, saw the Dow drop 110 points – the largest point drop in history up to that time. Of course, Monday was the Crash. On that Monday, the futures opened down about 20 points (roughly equivalent to 120 points today, by my estimate). So I learned to respect a market as being potentially extremely bearish if there is a big drop into a closing low on Friday. Another notable (bad) memory came in August, 2015, when $SPX opened down 100 points on Monday after an ugly close to the week before.
